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CONTRACT LAW 
SUMMARY 
UNITED STATES v. RELIANCE INSURANCE 
CO.: NINTH CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES A NEED 
TO PROTECT SURETIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Reliance Insurance CO.,1 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a material modification of an underlying contract 
relieved a surety of its liability under a bond. t The holding 
demonstrated the court's recognition of the need to protect sure-
ties against prejudicial modifications. 
II. FACTS 
In February of 1983, the Army-Navy '83 Foundation (Foun-
dation) was formed to facilitate preparations for the 1983 Army-
Navy football game.s Foundation thereafter, entered into a con-
tract with the Army Athletic Association and the Naval Acad-
emy Athletic Association (collectively the Academies).· The con-
tract provided that Foundation would receive all revenues 
generated from ticket sales and broadcasting rights, and in re-
turn Foundation promised to pay each Academy their share of 
1. 799 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Jameson, D.J., District of Montana, sitting by 
designation; the other panel members were Tang, J., and Brunetti J.). 
2. 1d. at 1387. 
3. 1d. at 1383. 
4.1d. 
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revenues,5 provide funds for transportation and housing,S and 
compensate the Academies up to $200,000 for any costs in excess 
of those expenses incurred by the Academies in the 1982 Army-
Navy game.' Finally, to secure its obligations the contract re-
quired Foundation to obtain two bonds, one of which secured 
the $200,000, and was the subject of the lawsuit.s 
Foundation thereafter, entered into a contract with Reliance 
Insurance Company (Reliance) whereby Reliance agreed to issue 
the bonds.8 Foundation assured Reliance that Foundation was 
entitled to the television proceeds from the game.10 However, 
subsequent to the issuance of the bonds, the Academies and 
Foundation, without the knowledge or consent of Reliance, 
agreed to three modifications.ll The first modification merely 
changed the date of the game. The second alteration provided 
that the Academies' share of the television proceeds, $1,100,000, 
would be paid directly to the Army Athletic Association, thereby 
relieving Foundation of its $1,100,000 obligation to the Acade-
mies.12 Under the third modification, the Academies agreed to 
initially pay for transportation, and in return Foundation waived 
its right to any remaining television or ticket revenues. 13 
Following the modifications, the Academies incurred ex-
penses that were in excess of the costs of the 1982 Army-Navy 
game. When the Academies demanded that Foundation comply 
with their agreement and pay $200,000 to cover the additional 
. expenses, Foundation refused to pay.l~ Thereafter, the United 
States, on behalf of the Academies brought an action against Re-
5. Id. Each Academy was promised $875,000·-$550,000 from television revenues 
and $325,000 from ticket sales and concession proceeds. Id. 
6. Id. The contract required Foundation to provide money to transport the cadets, 
midshipmen, and support personnel to Pasedena, California, where the game was played. 
It also required Foundation to provide for houshlg and meals. Id. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. at 1383·84. The other bond guaranteed the $650,000 for ticket and concession 
revenues. It was released by the Academies when they received their money. Id. 
9. Id. at 1384. 
10. Id. The television proceeds amounted to $1,450,000. Id. Foundation also assured 
lU!liance that it would assign the television proceeds to lU!liance as collateral for the 
bonds. However, the assignment was never made. Id. 
11.Id. 
12.Id. 
13.Id. 
14. Id. Though the facts do not state why Foundation refused to pay, it appears that 
Foundation had no funds to pay the Academies as a result of the modifications. Id. 
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liance to recover on the bond that guaranteed that amount.16 
Both sides moved for summary judgment. UI The district court 
granted Reliance's motion, holding there were undisputed facts 
supporting the conclusion that the bond was exonerated as a re-
sult of material modifications of the underlying contract.17 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
III. THE COURTS ANALYSIS 
The primary issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Reliance Insurance CO.IS was whether the modifica-
tions of the bonded contract exonerated Reliance of liability. Ut 
Generally, a surety will be discharged when the bonded contract 
is materially changed, without the surety's knowledge or con-
sent, causing damage or prejudice to the surety.20 Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 2819 provides that a surety is discharged if the creditor, with-
out the consent of the surety alters the original obligations, 
rights, or remedies of the parties.21 In Reliance v. Colbert," the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that any 
changes to the underlying contract should be brought to the at-
tention of the surety so it may decide whether it wishes to con-
tinue its commitment.23 
Reliance argued the modifications resulted in a net loss to 
Foundation,24 while the Academies claimed the net effect was a 
benefit to Foundation.2& The court concluded that neither party 
was entirely correct. The first and second modification had no 
effect. The first simply changed the date of the game, and in the 
15.Id. 
16. Id. at 1383. 
17.Id. 
18. 799 F.2d 1382. 
19. Id. at 1385. The Ninth Circuit decided to look to state substantive law for guide 
ance, since there was no clear body of federal law on the subject of sureties. Id. 
20. See Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Town of Cloverdale, Indiana. 699 F.2d 417 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (surety is discharged if contract is altered without the surety's consent). 
21. Cal. Civ. Code § 2819 provides in part, "A surety is exonerated ••• if by any act 
of the creditor, without the consent of the surety the original obligation of the principal 
is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the principal, in 
respect thereto, in anyway impaired or suspended." 
22. 365 F.2d 530 (D.C.Cir.1966). 
23. Id. at 534. 
24. Reliance Insurance Co., 799 F.2d at 1385. 
25.Id. 
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second, Foundation gave up its right to the $1,100,000 in ticket 
revenues, but it was also relieved of its obligation to guarantee 
that amount.26 However, the third modification had a substan-
tial effect to the detriment of Foundation.27 The language of the 
modification indicated that though Foundation was no longer 
entitled to any television revenues, it was still obligated to pay 
for the transportation and housing.28 The third modification 
merely shifted the immediate burden of paying for transporta-
tion to the Academies, but Foundation was ultimately responsi-
ble. In return, Foundation relinquished its sole remaining bene-
fit under the contract, the right to receive the excess television 
revenues.29 The court found that if Reliance knew that Founda-
tion was not entitled to the television proceeds, it was highly 
unlikely that Reliance would have issued the bonds since the 
venture would have been too risky.30 Under the original con-
tract, Foundation would have received money from the televi-
sion revenues to pay its obligations. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the third modification clearly prejudiced Reliance.31 
The Academies pursued several defenses, all of them unsuc-
cessful. First, the Academies argued that Reliance was estopped 
from raising the defense of modification because it was based on 
a claim for television proceeds through an assignment that 
Foundation promised Reliance, but never made.32 The court ex-
plained that the Academies mischaracterized Reliance's de-
fense.33 Reliance's defense was that the modifications materially 
altered the underlying contract which accordingly exonerated 
Reliance from liability. It had nothing to do with the assign-
ment.34 However, the court noted that had Reliance based its 
defense on the promised assignment, it would have been es-
topped because it was based on a secret agreement.31i 
26.Id. 
27. Id. at 1386. 
28. Id. at 1385-86. 
29. Id. at 1386. 
30.Id. 
31.Id. 
32. Id. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. See Busse v. Pacific Employees Insurance Co., 43 Cal. App. 3d 558, 117 Cal. 
Rptr. 718 (1974). 
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Secondly, the Academies claimed that Reliance had waived 
or ratified the modifications of the bonded contract. M In 
Mardirosian v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.,a7 the 
Ninth Circuit stated that a finding of waiver requires a known 
right, and an intent to relinquish that right." Judge Jameson 
concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish Reliance's 
knowledge of the modifications, a. or to establish Reliance's con-
sent, or its intent to waive its rights. fO 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit held that material modifications, at least 
one of which was prejudicial to Reliance, released Reliance from 
its obligation under the bond. The decision demonstrated that 
the Ninth Circuit is reluctant to hold a surety liable on a bond 
where modifications are made without ita consent. Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit joined with other circuits in recognizing the rights 
of sureties and the need to protect them against prejudicial 
alterations. 
Suheil Joseph Totah* 
36. Reliance Insurance Co., 799 F.2d at 1382. 
37. 739 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1984). 
38. Id. at 477. 
39. Reliance Imurance Co., 799 F.2d at 1387. 
40. Id. The Academies' final argument waa that the district court deprived them of 
sufficient opportunity for discovery, by denying their request for further discovery. Id. In 
Foster v. Arcata Associates, 772 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit held that a 
district court has wide latitude in permitting discovery, and its ruling will not be over-
turned unless it clearly abuses ita discretion. Arcata, 772 F.2d at 1467. Judge Jameson 
concluded that the Academies had ample opportunity for discovery during the six 
months after Reliance's answer, and during the four months after providing for discov-
ery. Reliance Insurance Co., 799 F.2d at 1388. Under the circumstances, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the district court did not abouse its discretion by denying further discov-
ery. Reliance Imurance Co., 799 F.2d at 1388. 
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